and exchange, they create an ever-changing environment in which they must, in turn, operate (Von Mises, 1949) . When combined with shifting consumer tastes, product technologies, and process innovations, these endogenous adaptations trigger a continual stream of modest perturbations, a few larger shifts, and the occasional 'wave of creative destruction' (Schumpeter, 1934) . As a result of this continual stream of change, it is impossible to fully know (and often to even approximately know) in advance the eventual scale, timing, and direction of market evolution (Kirzner, 1997) .
Central to this perspective on market process are the twin notions of ignorance and discovery. Because of the incompleteness of market knowledge, ignorance about at least some opportunities for more advantageous resource use always exists. Yet this ignorance goes well beyond the familiar assumption that managers face asymmetric or imperfect information simply because it is costly to produce (Stiglitz, 1994) . Rather, ignorance is about managers' being fundamentally unaware of what they do not know about a market's particulars (Kirzner, 1997) . Moreover, ex ante ignorance means that opportunities are not so much planned as discovered. That said, such opportunities are not simply lying around in obvious places waiting to be seized. Rather, most are discovered through active participation in the market (Kirzner, 1997) . Managers uncover (often serendipitously) the existence of opportunities as they operate in the market and then they update their knowledge bases (Hayek, 1948) .
As this dynamic market process unfolds, managers play dual roles (Kirzner, 1973) . They are both entrepreneurs and resource owners. While the first role involves working through ignorance to discover often fleeting opportunities, the second centers on decisions regarding which resources are needed (or not), and how such resources ought to be configured to capture and exploit the attractive opportunities that emerge. Obviously then, in markets that are in perpetual disequilibrium managers are continuously adjusting and even transforming their resources as plans are revised, creating fresh resource combinations to satisfy those plans. Yet as the Austrian perspective also emphasizes, a firm's resource system has complex interactive effects that make it impossible to accurately predict the outcomes of strategic actions (Lachmann, 1978) . Given the inevitable lack of clarity of outcome for these decisions, managers often make mistakes. From an Austrian perspective such mistakes are not necessarily problematic. They may inadvertently yield potentially valuable resource combinations, and related novel opportunities for future entrepreneurial action (Lachmann, 1978) .
Austrian economics uniquely provides an account of markets in disequilibrium. This disequilibrium is driven by the combination of endogenous actions of managers and the exogenous shocks of changes in technologies, consumer preferences, government actions, and the like. As competing managers discover idiosyncratic and sometimes surprising opportunities for new sources of profit, this disequilibrium is perpetuated. In the course of exploiting these emergent and fleeting opportunities, managers recombine firms' resources in attempts to produce desired effects. Some of these effects are predictable, but others are unforeseen. The latter introduces a stream of surprises, and even mistakes that cause a market's particulars -and therefore the opportunities that they hold -to be constantly reshaped. Perpetual motion is the result. 
Implications for strategic organization
Strategy is fundamentally concerned with a firm being unique in some competitively advantaged way. Moving past this broad observation, strategy scholars have relied on variants of economics to develop the logic by which firms achieve the competitive advantages that lead to superior performance. Theories of strategic positioning (such as the five-forces framework) rely on industrial organization economics to argue that superior performance is derived from a unique configuration of tightly linked activities that create a defensible strategic position (Porter, 1985) . Resource-based theories rely on the several schools of microeconomics to argue a strategic logic that competitive advantage derives from valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources that may be leveraged across different products and markets (Conner, 1991) . Similarly, Austrian economics can also be used to draw out implications for firms' strategy.
As noted at the outset, the implications of the distinctive perspective of Austrian economics most frequently relate to market-level rather than to firm-level phenomena (that are likely to be of greater interest to scholars of strategic organization). Our thesis is that there is considerable potential for advance by switching the lens of Austrian economics from markets per se to the strategic and organizational implications for firms operating in such markets.
Logic of opportunity
Perhaps the most important implication is the shift in the logic of strategy in turbulent, high-velocity environments. Since wealth creation derives from entrepreneurial discovery, the related strategic logic becomes that of sensing, capturing, and exploiting opportunities. This contrasts with the logic of building defensible positions, or of leveraging uniquely valuable resources that are inherent in the perspectives of positioning and competence. It also suggests that managers should seek out uncertainty rather than construct positioning defenses to avoid it. By gravitating toward or even inciting uncertainty, managers will be more likely to find themselves in the midst of turbulence, where the most and best opportunities for profit and growth lie. It is precisely this turbulence that produces ignorance about market particulars, which is a prerequisite for entrepreneurial discovery.
Routines versus simple rules
Given a logic of sensing and seizing opportunities, the Austrian view further implies the need for strategy to focus on the processes by which such actions actually occur. Since opportunities are often numerous, fleeting, and ill-formed, such processes are probably not the deeply-grooved routines of the resource-based view (Teece et al., 1997) . When markets are stable or perhaps only incrementally changing, such stable processes may be relevant for constructing interrelated activity systems or leveraging resources into nearby markets. Escalating turbulence, however, leads to pockets of very attractive, but over-abundant opportunities. Therefore, the relevant questions become: which to choose? how to exploit? In contrast to other views, the Austrian perspective suggests that strategy in such markets is likely to consist of simple rules that shape and guide
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3 4 7 action to determine which opportunities to pursue, how to pursue them, at what rate, and when to stop (Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001 ). These simple rules take on particular significance given the likelihood of surprises and mistakes in the market process described by Austrian economics. Given ex ante ignorance about market particulars and the complexity of effects inherent in resource combinations, managers will inevitably initiate some actions in the expectation of a certain outcome, only to have the realized effects turn out to be quite different. These frequent surprises (both positive and negative) mean that any one action will probably require further adaptations. Simple rules become the structure of guiding principles within which managers can adjust to and even exploit these surprises (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) . If these rules were more structured into stable routines, they would be too inflexible to enable managers to adjust as novel opportunities are confronted. If they were completely unstructured, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve coherent outcomes and build competitive advantage.
The role of time
The primary temporal consideration of traditional strategic perspectives centers on the presence or absence of first-mover advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) . Such advantages are related to the presence of structural factors in an industry, such as economies of scale and network effects. Beyond this consideration, timing plays almost no strategic role. By contrast, timing is central to strategy in the context of the Austrian view. Because markets are in constant disequilibrium, attractive opportunities are transient. Therefore, timing in terms of the temporal window when they can be captured and exploited is limited.
Further, the Austrian view recognizes that time is a flow, not simply a series of time periods as depicted in a multi-period game in which strategy may be adjusted in terms of a sequence of competitive moves. Strategy from the Austrian perspective deals with the very real and ever-present tension between exploiting today's market opportunities as against moving to those of tomorrow (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998) . To use an alternative lexicon, strategy must address the inherent tension between path-dependent and path-breaking actions. Indeed, a central aspect of strategy therefore deals with managing these tensions in an ongoing manner. Roberts and Amit (2003) demonstrate this point in their analysis of innovation and financial performance in the retail banking industry. They find that superior financial performance is not always the result of moving first, but may be a function of how a firm's managers develop a particular history of innovative activity. When market turbulence is the rule, firms that are both prolific and consistent in their innovative activity outperform those that are simply concerned with moving first.
Real-time learning
Thus far, we have highlighted several of the implications of Austrian economics for strategy at the level of the firm. The perspective also, however, has implications for organization. The principal contemporary theories of organization, such as social network, ecological, resource dependence, and institutional theories are not so much focused on
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organization per se, but rather on the relationship between the firm and its environment. The internal workings of the organization are often of little interest. In contrast, the organizational implications of Austrian economics are fundamentally concerned with what occurs inside the organization. Given market turbulence, the Austrian view implies that it is necessary to experience the market in order to uncover opportunities that are not observable in advance. In other words, a priori analysis has limited value as appropriate actions become evident only during the process of competing. Capturing and exploiting profitable opportunities necessarily depends upon experiential learning processes, such as learning by doing, improvisation, and probing (Miner et al., 2001) . These types of learning rely on active participation in markets, and not on complex structures and/or detailed routines that facilitate planning and a priori reasoning. In contrast with command-and-control hierarchy, firms with an emphasis on real-time learning are decentralized, with explicit attention to activities, like prototyping, that inherently misfit with existing operations and generate mistakes even as they reveal opportunities.
Modularity
If real-time learning enables managers to more readily discover (often serendipitously) opportunities in a timely manner, a modular organization allows managers to rearrange their resources more quickly to exploit these opportunities. By adding, subtracting, combining, and splitting modular arrangements or 'patches' of organizational resources, managers are able to capture and exploit the opportunities that real-time learning processes reveal (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Siggelkow, 2002) . Moreover, these modules are typically loosely coupled. Rather than tightly bound activity systems or bundles of enduring core competencies, these modules can be reconnected in novel ways to capture new opportunities (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2003) .
Towards the confluence of strategy and organization
Perhaps most significantly, both the strategic and organizational implications of Austrian economics converge on the importance of process. Process in the form of simple rules is at the heart of a strategy that relies on sensing, seizing, and exploiting fleeting opportunities in a uniquely advantaged way. Process is also central to a view of organization that relies not only on modular structure, but also more fundamentally on processes that include real-time learning and go beyond these to the processes by which resources are gained, reconfigured, and released. Without effective processes, managers cannot successfully sense, seize, and exploit opportunities for profit and growth. Indeed, in the extreme the Austrian view may well imply, given that strategy and organization are intimately bound to processes, that the strategy is the organization.
Pressing forward
While some strategy scholars have explored the Austrian view as the basis for analyzing market-level issues, there has been less interest in its implications for thinking at the level of the firm. Given increasing research emphasis on market dynamics, however,
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Austrian economics, with its emphasis on disequilibrium, seems to us a prime candidate for generating fresh theoretical insights at the intersection of the strategy and organization literatures. Taking a cue from Porter's inversion of perspective in industrial organization economics, we switched from the usual market lens of Austrian economics to ask what the firm-level implications for strategy and organization are. Our answer sketches out six basic strategic and organizational insights. Austrian economics offers a process-oriented view of markets that takes serendipity, timing, misfit, and mistakes seriously. Applying these insights to strategy suggests that managers should engage market uncertainty, rely on a strategic logic of opportunity, and be guided by simple rules. Applying these insights to organization suggests that managers should employ real-time learning processes such as experimentation, improvisation, and trial-and-error as well as modular structures. The Austrian view thus unequivocally signals the importance of the processes by which managers continually engage the market and continuously recombine resources, all the while remaining alert to novel opportunities. In the Austrian perspective, managers and their actions matter fundamentally. Austrian economics also offers traction in domains where our current theories tend to stumble, that is, markets characterized by non-linear change and/or high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity, and firms (both young and old) with entrepreneurial aspirations. Taken together, these observations make, we think, a compelling case for closer scrutiny of Austrian economics in future research on organization, strategy, and most importantly, their intersection -strategic organization.
In closing, we must stress that Austrian economics has been criticized for its lack of empirical agenda to accompany its theoretical development. Most pressing then is the development of a stock of empirical research to support these emerging theoretical insights. Part of the explanation for the dearth of empirical work in this area may be the modal research approach, that is, archival data analyzed using econometric techniques. The emergent, non-deterministic account of markets offered by the Austrian view may not lend itself easily to this type of analysis. Since market activity is purposeful, but all relevant knowledge is not available a priori, the task of the researcher is to first articulate the logic that guides action, and then to complement this with studies that capture the relevant processes, while respecting their emergent character. In addition, as researchers, we may need to go inside the firm much more than is de rigueur now to better understand the processes that drive firm's success.
A minority of organizational scholars and economic historians are actively pursuing these alternative research strategies, many of which are aptly described as descriptive and/or non-deterministic case studies. Complementing such analyses with studies using other methods tailored to tackling non-linearities (e.g. simulations) may yield further insight into the specific processes underlying the dynamics of performance heterogeneity.
Reprise
Our message is simple. The occasionally maligned and often neglected Austrian school of economics offers the promise of theoretical advances at the intersection of strategy and organization, by offering a fresh view of the market as a process in disequilibrium. In turn, this market-oriented view may well provide the seeds of novel theories of strategic organization.
Note 1 Our sketch of Austrian economics is necessarily brief, and admittedly selective. For a more comprehensive treatment, see Kirzner (1997) .
